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I. INTRODUCTION
For more than two centuries, the southeastern United States was blessed
with more than enough water for its needs. Unlike the ard western region of
the country, which has been plagued by water rights disputes since the middle
of the nineteenth century,' the Southeast has always had an ample water
supply.2 In the 1980s, however, severe droughts exposed problems within the
region's water rights system; Georgia, Alabama, and Florida were forced to
recognize that continued growth was putting a strain on their natural
3
resources.
The result of that recognition has been a contentious and divisive process
of negotiation. Those negotiations have been hampered by the inability of the
region's system of water allocation to deal effectively with situations of
scarcity! The system of international law has proven effective in resolving a
number of historic water rights disputes.' In those disputes, three factors
appear to have improved the fluidity of the negotiation process: the acceptance
of the equitable utilization principle," the presence of a strong, autonomous
mediator,7 and the threat of force in the event of a failure in negotiations.'
These three factors have increased the efficiency of past international water
rights disputes.9 Efforts at incorporating them into the context of the tri-state
water dispute could help expedite the negotiation process.
A. The ChattahoocheeRiver Basin
The Chattahoochee River is one of the Southeast's primary water
resources.' The river springs in the mountains of northern Georgia and flows
to the southwest, through the city of Atlanta and on to form the southern half

' See Larry Copeland, Water Wars Loom Amid Southern Boom, USA TODAY, Nov. 24,
1998, at 5A. See also Grady Moore, Water Wars: Interstate Water Allocation in the Southeast,
14-SUM NAT. RESOuRCEs & ENV'T 5 (1999).
2 See Copeland, supra note 1.
Moore, supra note 1.
4 See infra Part IIA.
5 See infra Part III.
6 See infra Part IV.A.
7 See infra Part IV.B.
See infra Part IV.C.

9 See infra Part III.
'0

Dustin S. Stephenson, The Tri-State Compact: Falling Waters and Fading Opportunities,

16 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 83, 89 (2000).
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of the Georgia-Alabama
joins the Chattahoochee,
The Apalachicola River
Florida and empties into

Mexico.

12

border." Near the Florida border, the Flint River
and from there it becomes the Apalachicola River.
continues south through the panhandle region of
the Apalachicola Bay, which is part of the Gulf of

The Chattahoochee holds great significance in all three states. The river is
vital to north Georgia, providing approximately seventy percent of the drinking
water for the metropolitan Atlanta area. 13 Atlanta is already home to some 3.5
million residents, and its population and economic activity are growing
rapidly.' 4 These growths are echoed by an increased need for water for both
residential and industrial purposes.
Alabama relies heavily on the Chattahoochee as well. The southeastern
portion of the state uses the river for much of its drinking water, as well as for
industrial and recreational purposes.'" Though Alabama's growth may be
slower than Atlanta's, the water supplied by the Chattahoochee is still critical
16
to the state.
Florida has a more single, specific reliance on the river than either Georgia
or Alabama. The Apalachicola Bay, where the river enters the Gulf of Mexico,
is home to ninety percent of Florida's $70 million per year oyster industry."
The fresh water flow from the river "stabilizes the salinity of the bay water at
the optimum level for oyster bed cultivation."
Florida thus has a strong
economic interest in maintaining a clean, natural flow in the Chattahoochee.

II d.at 85.
12 Id.

(citing GuY J.KE.NHOFER,

JR., METROPOLITAN PLANNING AND RIVER BASIN

30 (1968)).
13 See Stephenson, supra note 10, at 84 (citing River Rivalry, ECONOMIST, Mar. 30, 1991,
at 26).
PLANNING: SOME INTERRELATIONSHIPS

" Malani Peeples, NPR's Morning Edition: Battlefor Water Rights (NPR radio broadcast,
Oct. 9, 1998), available at 1998 WL 3309037. See also Greg Jaffe, Water DealMay Settle Old

Dispute, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 11, 1996, at F1 (stating that by a 1990 estimate, Atlanta was
expected to experience a population growth of 800,000 in the next twenty years).
"5See Stephenson, supranote 10, at 85 (citing Jim Nesbitt, Water Wars Move South, East
as Cities Gulp Supplies, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, May 24, 1998, at A25) [hereinafter
Water Wars Move].
16 Id.

" See Jonathan Kerr, Southeastern States Form Interstate Compact to Resolve Water
Disputes,WEST'S LEGALNEWS, Sept. 18, 1996, availableat 1996 WL 524406; Peeples, supra

note 14.
" See Stephenson, supra note 10 (citing Water Wars Move, supra note 15).
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B. The Dispute
In 1989, the state of Georgia and the United States Army Corps of
Engineers entered into an agreement for significant additional withdrawal from
the Chattahoochee River.' 9 This was done to accommodate Atlanta's rapid
growth and corresponding increasing need for water for both domestic and
commercial uses. When this contract was announced, the state of Alabama
commenced a lawsuit seeking an injunction against the implementation of the
contract.2' The state of Florida joined the suit shortly thereafter, hoping to
protect its interests in the Chattahoochee.2"
Before the case came to judicial resolution, the Governors of all three states
agreed to suspend legal action and move to negotiations.22 The agreement also
froze the water usage at current levels and forced the states to fund a five-year
Army Corps of Engineers study of the current and future water use requirements of the three states.23 In anticipation of the study's completion, the
legislatures of all three states passed a bill forming an interstate water
compact.2 This compact created a commission' to be made up of "one
representative from each state (appointed by the Governor), plus one [nonvoting]26 federal representative (appointed by the President) to analyze the
results of the comprehensive study and negotiate each state's allocation. 27
The compact was signed into law by President Clinton on November 20,
1997.' The Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint Commission's (ACF) structure
is considered effective because it allows appropriate water resource experts to
"9See Jaffe, supra note 14 (noting that Atlanta proposed to withdraw an additional 529
million gallons a day, a fifty percent increase in its total withdrawals).
1' Jeffrey Uhlman Beaverstock, Learningto Get Along: Alabama, Georgia,Floridaand the
ChattahoocheeRiver Compact, 49 ALA. L. REv. 993, 994 (1998).
2 See Mike Williams, FloridaSeafood Workers FearBeing Left High, Dry in Water War,
ATLANTA J.-CONST., Aug. 9, 1991, at F4.
22 See Tom Watson, Pact Eases Water War in Southeast; 3-State Disputeof River Supply
Has Threatened Atlanta's Growth, WASH. POST, Jan. 4, 1992, at A8. The agreement was
reached on January 3, 1992. Id.
23 See id.
24 Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 105-104, 111 Stat.
2219 (1997). The compact was signed into law by all three states in 1997. O.C.G.A. § 12-10100, F.S.A. § 3.73.71, and ALA. CODE 1975 § 33-19-1.
1 Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin Compact, § 1, art. VI(a).
26 See id.
27 Stephenson, supranote 10, at 88 (citing Charles Seabrook, Heading Offa Tri-State Water
War, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Feb. 19, 1998, at C1).
' See Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin Compact, supra note 24.

2004]

FAILINGS OF TRI-STATE WATER NEGOTIATIONS

be involved in the negotiations. 29 Experts would also be involved in the
enforcement of any agreement that might result from the ACF Commission's
work. 0
As of yet, however, the ACF Commission has not been able to come to any
agreement. Since the creation of the ACF Commission, numerous extensions
have been granted," and seemingly little forward movement has been made.
Many factors are to blame for this lack of progress. One key setback was the
gubernatorial elections of 1998, when all three states elected new governors.
The new governors brought "new policies, less cooperation, and less
knowledge of the situation as a whole.13 2 Also, there have been questions as
to the good faith of the efforts being put forward by all the parties.33 For
example, in 1997, Georgia budgeted $46 million to proceed with a reservoir
plan involving withdrawal from the Chattahoochee River.34 This was done
despite the 1992 agreement that halted all legal action and froze water
withdrawal levels. Georgia ceased its plans in the face of protests from the
other parties, but this incident "threatened to derail the entire compact
process."3 5
It is possible that both Alabama and Florida might also not be negotiating
in the best of faith.36 They might be delaying the proceedings in hopes that
Georgia will be forced to locate another water source to fulfill its continually
expanding needs.37 If Georgia finds such a source, Georgia's bargaining
position as to the Chattahoochee allocation will be greatly compromised. 3,
Thus, both Alabama and Florida have at least a potential motivation to prolong
the negotiations of the ACF Commission. Georgia, conversely, would like to

Stephenson, supra note 10, at 102.

Id. at 101. See generally Apalachicola Chattahoochee Flint River Compact (establishing
that any agreement reached under the compact would create a permanent body to monitor and
30

enforce the agreement).
31 The initial deadline for completion of a water allocation plan was December 31, 1998.
Apalachicola Chattahoochee Flint River Basin Compact, supra note 24, § 1, art. VI(g)(12); art.
VII(a); art. VIII(a)(3). Since then, the deadline has been extended at least a dozen times. Stacy
Shelton, Water Wars: Tri-state Negotiations Covered Up, BarrSays, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Sept.
9, 2002, at B2.
32 Stephenson, supra note 10, at 102-03.

11Id. at 106.
34 Id.

35 Id.
36 id.

37 id.
3 Id. at 106-07.
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resolve the dispute without resorting to another water source.39 Therefore,
Georgia has the strongest vested interest in resolving the water allotment
dispute as quickly as possible.
Recently, Georgia has again threatened the negotiating process. In January
2003, Georgia reached an agreement with the Army Corps of Engineers to
allow the Atlanta metropolitan area a substantially larger allocation of water
from the Chattahoochee.' This agreement brought the feasibility of success
of the tri-state negotiations into question: both Alabama and Florida appeared
unwilling to continue negotiating in the face of what they view as an act in bad
faith. Though Georgia subsequently withdrawn its plans, the negotiations have
continued to flounder.4 ' This faltering of the settlement process demonstrates
the need for improvement in doctrinal approach to water allocation.
II. UNITED STATES LEGAL BACKGROUND

The U.S. framework system of water appropriations, under which the tristate water negotiations are taking place, lacks key components present in
water rights dispute resolution under international law. These components
make a settlement more likely. In order to consider whether international law
has any relevant lessons for the tri-state water negotiations, it is necessary to
first consider the legal framework in which the negotiations are currently
taking place.
A. Water Appropriationin the United States
Water appropriation law in the United States has traditionally taken on two
distinct forms: riparianism and prior appropriation. In the eastern United
States, riparianism is the primary doctrine of water rights law.42 Riparianism
functions under the assumption that water from a given source is available to
all parties owning property adjacent to that source: all uses of the water are
permissible as long as they do not "unreasonably interfere"' 3 with other uses

19Id. at 107.
40 Stacy Shelton, Georgia Water Accord Will Hike Charges,ATLANTA J.- CONST., Jan. 21,
2003, at Al.
41 Stacy Shelton, Water Feud Likely to Spill into the Court, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Sept. 2,
2003, at Al.
42 Moore, supra note 1,
at 6.
43 id.
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and can be considered a "reasonable use."" This doctrine is functional and
easy to administer when water is abundantly available (as it traditionally has
been in the southeastern United States). This system, however, can be very
problematic when resources become scarce; the difficulty then becomes
determining whether something constitutes a "reasonable use."45
In the western part of the country, water rights arise from the system of
prior appropriation." Prior appropriation is based on the assumption that
" 'first in time is first in right.' ""' Once a person puts a source of water to a
particular use, that use has priority over all later-arising uses." If the water is
scarce, the use that was established first will be first to be fulfilled. This
priority is maintained even during times of "drought and at the expense of
'
more socially beneficial uses."49
The prior appropriation doctrine was
developed because during the time of western expansion, it was believed that
the riparian system would hinder development. 5 Early settlers would be more
likely to move westward if they knew that any use they made of the water there
would be secured from subsequent usurpers. This system of water allocation
is still maintained in the West today. The only modification is that in a modem
prior appropriation system a water right is usually requested from and granted
by the state government. 5'
" Tyler v. Wilkinson, 24 F. Cas. 472 (C.C.R.I. 1827) (No. 14312). This case originated the
reasonable use doctrine, which abandoned the natural flow theory of riparian rights (under which
a riparian landowner could not make use of the water in any way that would materially reduce
the water's flow). Id.
4 Stephenson, supra note 10, at 91.
Moore, supra note 1, at 6.
47 Id.

48 See id.
49 Id.

50 See WnILAm GOLDFARB, WATER LAw

15 (1984). During the western expansion, most

of the lands were owned by the government, but the people were encouraged to settle there.
These settlers were basically trespassing on public land, and could thus have no riparian rights.
By adopting the prior appropriation system, these settlers were allowed to make legal claim to
the water they used. Additionally, many of the lands available to the western settlers (for such
purposes as farming and especially mining) were distant from any water source. To limit water
use to those occupying property directly adjacent to awater source would have limited the ability
of settlers to make full use of the West's resources. In its expansive western territories, the
government therefore rejected the riparianism doctrine and allowed people to divert, or
"appropriate," water and transport it from the source. This approach to "appropriation" was
borrowed from the mining industry, of which many of the early settlers were apart. When a new
site for a mine was discovered on public lands, the discoverer had rights to the mine.
" See Stephenson, supra note 10, at 89. Under modern prior appropriations, the point of
contention is which use was "granted" first, rather than which use was made first. Id.

480
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There has been a trend, particularly in the Southeast, towards combining
these two doctrines of water appropriation. 52 These systems are designed to
"recognize riparian rights, while also implementing an administrative permit
mechanism for new demands placed on water resources. 5 3 Such systems still
do not place "as much emphasis on priority in time as does the western model
of prior appropriation."' Florida's system involves such a combination, and
is implemented through a statutorily based three-prong test.5 5 Any proposed
use must pass this test in order for a permit to be granted. While Georgia's
system is still considered to be riparian, Georgia has also compromised by
adopting a "quasi-appropriation 'permit' system onto the existing riparian
' The move away from a pure riparian system is indicative of the
framework."56
fact that the riparian system is not well equipped to handle instances of
scarcity.
B. DisputeResolution Under U.S. Law
There are three methods for resolving water rights disputes under U.S. law:
57
legislative apportionment, judicial apportionment, and interstate compact.
Interstate compact, the method invoked to settle the water dispute over the
Chattahoochee River Basin, is widely considered to be the best form of
allocation, principally because of the perception that "congressional and
judicial apportionment schemes often are based on incomplete information.""8
The interstate compact process is itself far from ideal, however, and some
52Id. at 91. Systems combining the characteristics of the riparian and the prior appropriation

doctrines are often referred to as "hybrid" systems. Id.
53Id. at 92.
5 Id.
5 Florida's three-prong test: the proposed use "must be defined as a reasonable beneficial
use, the use must not adversely affect other riparian users, and the use must be consistent with
the public interest." Stephenson, supra note 10, at 92 (citing Ronald A. Christaldi, Sharing the
Cup: A proposalforthe Allocation of Florida'sWater Resources, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1063,
at 1080-81 (1996)).
56 Moore, supra note 1, at 6. Georgia requires a permit for any new withdrawal of more than
100,000 gallons per day. Regulations for granting the permit establish a hierarchy of uses; the
result is similar to a prior appropriation system. Id.
5 Stephenson, supra note 10, at 93.
5' See Beaverstock, supranote 20, at 1007; GoLDFARB, supranote 50, at 32; David N. Copas
Jr., The Southeastern Water Compact: Panaceaor Pandora'sBox? A Law and Economics
Analysis of the Viability of Interstate Water Compacts, 21 WM. & MARY ENVTL L. & POL'Y
REV. 697, 714 (1997) (stating that interstate compacts are both the most common and most
desirable method of resolving water rights disputes).
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important concepts of conflict resolution can be drawn from other methods of
apportionment.
Congress' right to legislatively apportion interstate waters is based in the
Commerce Clause.59 Congress has the power to settle interstate water disputes
by passing a bill dictating distribution of the waters." However, Congress has
proven reluctant to use this power.6' Congress has generally refrained from
using this authority because this issue is highly politicized, forcing representa'
tives to "choose a side, unless their home state has a stake in the outcome,"62
and a Congressman would rather not alienate a number of his colleagues
unnecessarily.
Furthermore, legislative apportionment is probably not desirable for the
parties involved either. Congress men are not necessarily qualified to settle an
interstate water rights dispute; they lack the scientific expertise that an
interstate commission might be able to apply.63 Moreover, a Congressman
from one state may have very little interest in the resolution of a dispute
between states on the other side of the country." Lastly, Congress is easily
influenced by special interest groups. Individual Congressmen might be
influenced by such groups, and thus might not make the most efficient
allocations.65 Obviously, this is an area of concern that extends to all
legislative decision-making. Nonetheless, the potential biases of legislators are
another reason why the states do not seek to have their water rights disputes
settled through legislative allocation.
Judicial apportionment is another option for allotting water rights. The
U.S. Supreme Court has automatic jurisdiction over any controversy between
the states,' and thus maintains jurisdiction over interstate water controversies.
The Supreme Court uses the principle of equitable utilization in its adjudication of interstate water controversies.67 This principle involves "abandonment
of the traditional common law allocations doctrines of riparian rights and prior
appropriations. The important consideration for the Court is arriving at an

11See Stephenson, supra note 10, at 93 (citing Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 597-98
(1963)). See also U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8.
60 See Stephenson, supra note 10, at 93.
61 Id.

( Id. at 94.
1 See generallyCopas, supra note 58, at 715.
4

Id.
Id.

66 U.S.

CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.

67 See Stephenson, supra note 10, at 93.
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equitable distribution of the water among the disputing states."6 The doctrine
of equitable utilization was borrowed from international law,69 and was first
adopted by the Supreme Court in Kansas v. Colorado.7" In implementing the
doctrine of equitable utilization, the Court has "laid out a number of factors to
consider," among them the type of consumptive use, the priority of appropriation, and the physical condition of the lands involved.7'
The equitable utilization principle can be effectively used to resolve water
rights disputes. However, despite the advantages of this principle, judicial
apportionment is not an ideal means for water rights dispute resolution.
Judicial apportionment has three primary drawbacks: lack of expertise of the
Court, the high costs of litigation, and the Court's lack of ability to monitor the
implementation of its solution. 72 Probably in large part based on the aforementioned reasons, the Court has implicitly expressed its desire that future water
rights disputes be handled between the states.73 Based on these concerns,
judicial apportionment is not a satisfactory means of resolving interstate water
disputes. 74 However, the doctrinal approach used in judicial apportionment
could be very helpful in otherwise resolving such disputes.
Interstate compacts are generally considered the best method of resolving
water rights disputes. 75 The key goal underlying interstate water compacts is
to make appropriations for future uses.76 In negotiating a compact, states
77
attempt to "anticipate future uses of water and apportion rights accordingly.

Beaverstock, supra note 20, at 1001 (citing WITI JAM GOLDFARB, WATER LAW 52-53
(1988)).
68

69

Id.

70 206 U.S. 46, 117 (1907).
71Copas, supranote 58, at 716-17 (citing Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589,618 (1945)).
72 Stephenson, supra note 10, at 96.
" See Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907) (showing that the Court was unwilling to deal
with the technical aspects of the case, choosing instead to merely state that the current pattern
of water usage was not objectionable). See also Beaverstock, supra note 20, at 1001
(interpreting Kansas v. Colorado to express the intention that "disputes between states over
interstate water resources be settled by sharing of the water").
"' Cf.Shelton, supra note 41 (arguing that despite the seeming inadequacies of judicial
apportionment, it seems likely that the ACF dispute will eventually be resolved by the court in
the face of the faltering negotiation process).
7 See Copas, supra note 58, at 714 (stating that interstate compacts are both the most
common and the most preferable method of settling water rights disputes).
76 Id. at 719.
7'Id. (citing Jerome C. Muys, Approaches and Considerationsfor Allocation of Interstate
Waters, in WATER LAw TRENDs, PoLICES AND PRACTICE 311, at 314 n. 17 (Kathleen M. Carr
& James D. Crammond eds., 1995) (citing the Colorado River Compact)).
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However, such estimates have the tendency to be imprecise, so the enforcement mechanism of the compact is extremely important.7" Compacts can be
enforced in two ways: first, through the compact itself (by including an
enforcement mechanism for state agencies to implement); or second, through
the creation of a permanent commission. 9 Such a commission can hopefully
exercise impartiality in its enforcement of the water allocations. As described
above, such a commission has been created for the tri-state dispute negotiations.8 o

Interstate water compacts have three primary advantages over the other

means of water allocation.8' First, compacts provide adaptability because they
are tailored to the specific situation. 2 Flexibility is even more present when,
as in the tri-state dispute, a commission has been established that can adapt the
allocations to meet changing conditions. 3 Second, interstate compacts are
considered advantageous because they can more easily involve expert
opinions.84 If the delegates are well-chosen by their respective states, they can
provide ample expertise in the area of water allocation. Third, in the case of
a compact that establishes a permanent commission, the parties can expect
effective enforcement.8 5 Having the states enforce their own allocations
(rather than having an autonomous commission to do so) leads to a clear
conflict of interests.
While water compacts are considered the best of the three major forms of
water allocation, they too are far from ideal. Water compacts are recognized
as having three principal detriments.86 First, they often lead to exceedingly
long periods of negotiation87 that can be very involved and expensive. Second,
states have the tendency to draft around the contentious issues with some
vagueness.88 States do not want to entirely bind themselves to limitations that
could be stifling. Some form of outside adjudication would probably be more

7' Stephenson, supra note 10, at 98.
Id.; Copas, supra note 58, at 719.
0 See Stephenson, supra note 10, at 102.
s' Id. at 99 (citing A. DAN TARLOCK, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES, § 10.24
(1988)).
82

Id.

83 Id.
84

Id.

85 Id
86 Id.

at 100 (citing CHARIES J.

MANAGEMENT
87

id.

88 Id.

419 (2d ed. 1980)).

MEYERS

& A.

DAN TARLOCK, WATER RESOURCE
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likely to result in a hard rule or decision. Last, the commissioners and compact
negotiators are beholden to the governments of the involved states. The
commissioners and negotiators typically are not free to formulate the state's
policy, but instead must constantly consult with policymakers who are usually
absent during negotiations. 9 Thus if the state's policy changes, the commissioner or negotiator is forced to alter his stance in the negotiations or
enforcement of the compact.'
Ill. WATER DIsPuTES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

Water has always presented a challenging issue for international law. By
its very transient nature, water does not conform to traditional conceptions of
ownership. The international legal community has had to address water rights
with increasing frequency as the populations and economies of the world's
nations have expanded. 9' The following are examples of historically
significant international water rights negotiations from which lessons and
observations can be made that might prove helpful in assessing the tri-state
water dispute.
A. The Indus Waters Treaty
The Indus Waters Treaty,' concluded by India and Pakistan in 1960, was
a landmark effort in international water rights dispute resolution. The Indus
River rises in Tibet and crosses the Indian subcontinent in the form of six
separate rivers. 93 These waters are used most notably for agricultural
irrigation, domestic consumption, and transport. 94 The partitioning of India
and Pakistan in 1947 resulted in India controlling most of the headwaters of
the river, while Pakistan controlled the larger share of the irrigated lands.95 In
the ensuing dispute, India, relying on the principle of territorial sovereignty,

"Id.
90Id.

9' Colleen P. Graffy, Water, Water, Everywhere, Nor Any Drop to Drink: The Urgency of
Transnational Solutions to International Riparian Disputes, 10 GEO. INT'LENV'L L. REv. 399,

425 (1998).
92 Indus Waters Treaty, Sept. 19, 1960, India-Pak., 419 U.N.T.S. 125.
9' Graffy, supra note 91, at 425.
94 Id.
95Id.
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initially asserted that it had the right to use the waters as it saw fit.96 Under
this doctrine, Pakistan would have had no say if India chose to divert most of
the headwaters for its own purposes.
Initial negotiations between India and Pakistan did not proceed well: India
continued to maintain its territorial sovereignty rights, while Pakistan sought
some sort of equitable resolution to the dispute.97 Proposals for commissions
to settle the dispute were rejected, and obligations under past agreements were
repudiated.98 A settlement to the dispute did not seem likely.
This stalemate was ended, however, when the president of the International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) offered his organization's services as a mediator to the dispute." Both parties accepted this offer,
and the treaty borne of the subsequent negotiations was based on the principle
of equitable utilization."° The Indus Waters Treaty allocated three of the six
rivers to each of the negotiating countries.' 0 ' It also resulted in the formation
of a Permanent Indus Commission with one representative from each country,
and it delineated various means through which any future disputes would be
settled. 102
The Indus Waters Treaty of 1960 demonstrates the effectiveness of the
principle of equitable utilization. This doctrine emphasizes distribution of
resources in the manner that is most beneficial to all the parties involved.
Equitable utilization has proven to be a mainstay of international water rights
negotiations.' 03 It transcends the limitations of the systems of water allocation
in the negotiating countries. The Indus Waters Treaty also demonstrates the
practicality and efficiency of having a strong, non-political mediator. Having
9 Id. at 425-26. See also Melissa Crane, Diminishing Water Resources and International
Law: U.S.-Mexico, A Case Study, 24 CORNELINT'LL.J. 299,305 (1991). Crane gives historical
background on the concept of territorial sovereignty, as defined in the United Nations General
Assembly Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources (1962) (signed after the
Indus Waters Treaty, but nonetheless an embodiment of historic international law).
"' Graffy, supra note 91, at 426.

98 Id.

"' Id. at 426-27. This idea was spurred when a former head of the Tennessee Valley
Authority suggested that the situation could more readily be solved by mediation of a nonpolitical third party such as the World Bank. Id.
"oSee id. at 427 (noting however, that the parties did within the treaty explicitly try to
prevent the formal endorsement of the equitable utilization principle (citing The Indus Waters
Treaty, supra note 92, art. XI(2). "Nothing in this treaty shall be construed by the Parties as in
any way establishing any general principle of law or any precedent.")).
101Id. at 427.
102 Id.
103See Crane, supra note 96, at 306.
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a mediator who is not beholden to any specific party benefits the fluidity of the
negotiation process. Both of these features could prove advantageous for
domestic interstate water disputes.
B. The Ganges River Treaty
The Ganges River Treaty of 1996'" between Indian and Bangladesh is
another important historical international water rights dispute settlement.
Though India traditionally has had better relations with Bangladesh than with
Pakistan, India and Bangladesh have a turbulent history of water sharing.'0 5
The Ganges River flows south from Nepal into West Bengal, where it splits
into two rivers. "0'
One portion continues to flow south through Indian territory
and becomes the Hooghly River, flowing through the city of Calcutta to the
Indian Sea."0 7 The other portion, taking the name Padema River, flows east
into Bangladesh before emptying south into the Bay of Bengal.108
To appreciate the significance of the 1996 Ganges River Treaty, one must
consider it in the context of the negotiations that preceded it. That history
began with India's 1951 decision to construct the Farakka Barrage' on the
Ganges River ten miles away from Bangladesh in the Indian territory of West
Bengal." 0 The Farakka Barrage, which was not completed until 1971, was
built to divert water from the Ganges River to the Hooghly."' During the
twenty years between the announcement of the construction and its completion, Pakistan (of which Bangladesh was then a part) strongly opposed the
Barrage's construction through various diplomatic means." 2 After Bangladesh
gained its independence from Pakistan, its relationship with India was much

" Treaty on Sharing of the Ganges Waters at Farakka, Dec. 12, 1996, Bangl.-India, 36
I.L.M. 519.
"0S
Salman M.A. Salman & Kishor Uprety, Hydro-Politicsin South Asia: A Comparative
Analsis of the Mahakali and Ganges Treaties, 39 NAT. RESOURcES J. 295, 304 (1999).
'06 Id. at 298.
107 See

id.

...Id. at 299.
09 A barrage is a manmade barrier in a flow of water; a dam.
"0 Id. at 301.
"'
1

Id.

See id. at 305. Pakistan believed that the proposed divergence was too large, and would
"negatively effect irrigation, decrease the water supply, inhibit fishery production, reduce
groundwater tables, aggravate the salinity problem, and restrict river navigation ... the most
frequently used mode of transportation in Bangladesh." Id.
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improved. Nevertheless, the Farakka Barrage remained a "thorny issue, and
Bangladesh opposed it vehemently."' 3
Despite this dispute, Bangladesh and India have been able to come to an
agreement on water issues in a number of instances. The first such agreement
went into effect in April of 1975, only three days prior to the commissioning
of the Farakka Barrage." 4 In a precursor to future agreements, the 1975
agreement only accounted for the remainder of the dry season of that year;
subsequent agreements regarding water distribution rights on the Ganges
continue to this day to regulate only the dry seasons. During the wet season,
water was available so abundantly that the countries did not deem it necessary
to regulate the allotment." 5 Perhaps the greatest significance of the 1975
agreement might be that it amounted to Bangladeshi acceptance of the reality
of the Farakka Barrage." 6
The next agreement between Bangladesh and India for allocation of the
Ganges River occurred in 1977."' This agreement ran for the next five years,
and again applied only during the dry season." 8 The 1977 agreement allotted
India a larger proportion of the water supply than had the 1975 agreement." 9
The 1977 agreement expired in 1982, but was replaced by another agreement
that same year, this one running for two years. 20 Following the expiration of
the 1982 agreement, a fourth agreement was signed in 1985.12' Both the 1982
and the 1985 agreements kept roughly the same terms and allocations as the
1977 agreement had contained.' 2 The 1985 agreement expired in 1988.123 It
was followed by a gap of more than eight years, in which there was no official
1 24
allocation of water rights on the Ganges between India and Bangladesh.
113Id.
1"4Id.

at 306.

"I Id. (explaining that there is no need to agree to water allotments between the months of

June and December).
116 Id. at 307.
117Id.
I's Id.

19Id. at 307-08. The 1975 agreement had allocated India between 20-25% of the predicted
Ganges water flow during the dry season; the 1975 agreement allocated India 41% of the
predicted water flow. Id.
20 Id. at 308.
121 Id.
122 Id. at

309-10. It is of note, however, that the 1982 and 1985 agreements did not have an

important guarantee clause of Bangladeshi allocation that the 1977 agreement contained. The
terms of allocation were progressively moving more in India's favor. Id.
12 Id. at 308.
124Id. at

310.
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The 1996 Ganges River Treaty brought the return to agreed-upon terms of
allocation. The Ganges Treaty generally followed the trends established in the
previous four agreements. Like those agreements, the 1996 Treaty was based
on the principle of equitable utilization." z Decisions were to be made to
further the comprehensive best interests of both parties to the agreement. Also
similar to the previous agreements, the 1996 Treaty only regulated the dry
season. 2 6 Lastly, the 1996 Treaty continued the trend of India enjoying larger
and larger portions of the Ganges' waters.' This trend could be attributed to
the equitable utilization principles, that allocations to India represented a more
efficient use of the waters. It is noteworthy, however, that India, which made
gains in its proportion of the allocation, was militarily the more powerful of
the negotiating countries.
C. The Mahakali Rivers Treaty
The Mahakali Rivers Treaty between India and Nepal,' also signed in
1996, is another example of a water allocation agreement based on many of the
same principles. The Mahakali River flows through the far western portion of
Nepal and goes on to form the western boundary between Nepal and India.' 29
When it flows into India, it is called the Sarada River. From there it joins the
30
Ghaghra River, and it eventually goes on to join into the Ganges River.'
The relationship between India and Nepal has typically been very strong
and peaceable. However, much like the relationship between India and
Bangladesh, water sharing and water-related development have proven to be
a weak spot in diplomacy.13 ' Rivers that flow from Nepal into India, such as
the Mahakali, have long been a source of water sharing disputes.'
There is
a notable exception to the similarities between the situation between Nepal and
India and that between India and Bangladesh: Nepal has the advantage of being
upstream from the more powerful India.

1'2

Id. at 324.

126See id. at 325.
127 Id. at

327 (stating that India's share of the Ganges water rights increased from 41% (under
the 1977, 1982, and 1985 agreements) to 48% under the 1996 Treaty).
12 Treaty Concerning the Integrated Development of the Mahakali River, Feb. 12, 1996,
India-Nepal, 36 I.L.M. 531 [hereinafter Mahakali Rivers Treaty].
129 Salman & Uprety, supra note 105, at 297.
130Id. at
131Id. at
132

Id.

298.
299.
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The 1996 Mahakali Rivers Treaty was in large part a consolidation of prior
agreements. The first of its components is the Sarada Treaty of 1920, an
agreement between the Colonia British Indian government and the government
of Nepal. Under this agreement, the Indian government gained the right to
dam the Mahakali River in Nepalese territory.'33 A channel, known as the
Sarada Canal, would flow from there into Indian territory. To accommodate
these plans, the Nepalese government agreed to exchange 4000 acres of
territory with India. 134 India would take possession of the lands needed for the
construction of the dam, and Nepal would gain a matching acreage of nearby
territory. In return for agreeing to this exchange of territory, Nepal was
35
guaranteed certain flows from the Sarada Canal for irrigation purposes.'
A second prior treaty consolidated into the Mahakali Rivers Treaty was the
Tanakpur Agreement.136 Under this agreement, reached in 1991, the Nepalese
government provided land for a retaining wall to regulate the river's flow.
While Nepal had been compensated in kind for the land it sacrificed under the
Sarada Treaty, under the Tanakpur Agreement it would not receive any land
from India.' 37 The Tanakpur Agreement did, however, involve a number of
13
stipulations aimed to compensate Nepal for its loss of territory. 1
However, many in Nepal soon came to regret their decision to enter into
this agreement. They felt that they had received inadequate compensation and
that India was benefiting from the project far more than was Nepal.139 It is still
a point of some debate as to why the Nepalese government would agree to this
exchange.'" It is possible that the Nepalese government did not understand
the magnitude of the sacrifices it was making. There is also speculation that
the Nepalese agreed to those terms in order to appease the stronger Indian
government,' 4 ' and that Nepal was intimidated into agreeing to those terms.

Id. at 301.
134 Id.
131Id.
Nepal was guaranteed between 400 and 1000 cubic-feet per second of water. Id.
136 Id. at 302.
137Id.
138 I. Tanakpur Agreement provided Nepal with another 150 cubic feet per second of water,
in addition to 10 megawatts of electricity. These allotments were seen as the compensation for
Nepal's loss of land. Id.
131

139

Id.

140

Id. at 302-03.

Id. at 302 (citing Abu Taher Salahuddin Ahmed, Challenges of Governance in Nepal:
Politico-EconomicandEthno-ReligiousDimensions,24 J.CONTEMP. ASIA 351, at 360 (1994)).
141
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Under the Mahakali Rivers Treaty, the committed permanent water
allotments continue to be governed by the Sarada Treaty. 4 2 Thus, it contains
terms of water distribution that date from over eighty years ago, when India
was ruled by the British and Nepal had a very small population. At that time
water distribution was not given the same significance and priority it now
enjoys. 43 Thus, though the Mahakali agreement is at least ostensibly modeled
on the principles of equitable utilization,1 " it does demonstrate how inequality
of power can manifest itself in negotiations.
The equitable utilization principle is used most prominently in the Mahakali
Treaty in those portions pertaining to the proposed Pancheshwar Multipurpose
Project.'4 5 This project will be placed along a portion of the Mahakali River
that forms the border between India and Nepal. The specifications of this
Project have not yet been finalized, but attempts have been made to address a
number of policy concerns, such as power generation, irrigation, and flood
control.
Under Article 3 of the Treaty, which addresses the Project, four overriding
principles are specified as governing the Project. First, the Project shall be
designed to produce the maximum total benefits for both countries: the plans
should not be affected by the resulting respective allotments. 47 Second, that
the two states shall implement projects jointly. Two power stations of equal
capacity are to be located on both sides of the Mahakali River, and the power
they produce shall be divided equally.'4 8 Third, the cost of the project shall be
bome by the two states in direct proportion to the benefits they shall receive. 49
The costs will be allotted when the final terms of apportionment are reached. 50
Fourth, a portion of Nepal's energy shall be sold to India, at a price and
quantity on which the parties shall agree.'
The Mahakali Rivers Treaty, and particularly the Pancheshwar Multipurpose Project, clearly represent a strong endorsement of equitable utilization

142

Id. at 311.

143 Id.

I" Id. at 320.
145 Id.
'"

Mahakali Rivers Treaty, supra note 128, art. 3, § 1.

147 Id.

Id. art. 3, § 2.
1"9Id. art. 3, § 3.
"5 Id art. 3 (declaring that the final terms of these apportionments shall be agreed to in the
form of a jointly prepared Detailed Project Report).
"15Id art. 3, § 4.
148
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principles. It is true that those principles could be compromised by some
specifics that are left unclear in the treaty. An example of that lack of clarity
is the treaty's stipulation that the states should be entitled to equal use of the
unutilized water,' 52 but only the Nepalese permanent allotments are specified
in the terms of the treaty. India has not committed itself to a current level of
water utilization, and thus might be able to manipulate future total allotments
by how it decides on the permanent levels of usage it indicates. But despite
these shortcomings, the Mahakali Rivers Treaty is a strong example of the
effective implementation of the principle of equitable utilization.
D. The Boundary Waters Treaty
The last important historic international water rights agreement for
consideration is the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty between the United States
and Canada.'
This treaty represented one of the first international water
rights treaties not oriented towards navigation.' 54 In contrast to the preceding
agreements, this treaty involved nations whose relations have traditionally
been strong, even in the area of water distribution rights. Nonetheless, the
1909 Boundary Waters Treaty is considered a landmark in water rights
negotiations.'
One of the Boundary Waters Treaty's most notable accomplishments was the creation of the International Joint Commission, one of the
first standing commissions of its kind.'56 Many subsequent water commissions, both domestically and internationally (including the ACF Commission),
are to some degree modeled after the International Joint Commission. To this
day, the International Joint Commission, established in the Boundary Waters
Treaty, continues to regulate57 water issues concerning the border between the
United States and Canada.

Salman & Uprety, supra note 105, at 321. Unutilized water refers to water that is not
allotted through other terms of the agreement, such as the incorporated Sarada Treaty. Id.
113 Treaty Between the United States and Great Britain Relating to Boundary Waters Between
the United States and Canada, Jan. 11, 1909, U.S.-Can., 36 Stat. 2448 [hereinafter Boundary
Waters Treatyl.
11 Graffy, supra note 91, at 424.
152

15

Id.

156Boundary

Waters Treaty, supra note 153, art. 3.
...
Id. art. IV. See Graffy, supra note 91, at 424 (stating that the jurisdiction of the
commission extends to "the uses of lakes and rivers which touch the border").
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'
The International Joint Commission is considered exceptionally effective. 58
A number of attributes have contributed to this success. First, the Commission
is considered effective because of its non-political composition.' Negotiations run more efficiently when the negotiators are independent experts.
Representatives who have to constantly report the details of the negotiations
to their governments greatly slow the proceedings, as demonstrated by the
effect that the gubernatorial elections of 1998 had on the ACF Commission's
negotiations. It is far more effective to allow the negotiators leeway in
determining the resulting agreement.
Second, the success of the International Joint Commission is bolstered by
the independent fact-finding and research capabilities of the non-political
delegates." 6 The delegates have the ability to find for themselves the
information on which they ultimately will base their decisions. This again
makes them less beholden to the capricious political considerations of their
governments. This manner of autonomy allows more efficient negotiation
power.
Third, the commission is considered effective because its method of dispute
resolution is based upon the equitable utilization principle,' 6 ' the overriding
principle in international water rights dispute resolution.162 This principle
allows for greater flexibility in negotiations and distribution of waters. The
U.S. government's use of the equitable utilization principle represents a
departure from the standard U.S. domestic doctrines of riparian rights and prior
appropriation. This departure was very important in making the International
Joint Commission so successful.
These three attributes, and the adaptability that they afford, are the keys to
the success of the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty and the International Joint
Commission that arose out of it."6 Negotiations will generally proceed better
if the negotiators are allowed the autonomy these attributes allow. Also, an
abandonment of the rigidities of the U.S. domestic systems of water rights
appropriation was vital in allowing the Boundary Waters Treaty to be
successful.

See Graffy, supra note 91, at 425.
Id. at 424. See Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 153, art. VII (stating that the
Commission should be comprised of three representatives of each country who are independent
experts rather than representatives of government).
' Graffy, supra note 91, at 424-25.
1 Id. at 424.
1 See Crane, supra note 96, at 306-07.
'

"5

'

Graffy, supra note 91, at 425.
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Perhaps the most notable attribute of the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty is
that, more than ninety years ago, the United States accepted and made use of
the equitable utilization principle with regards to international negotiations.
Thus, the practicality of the equitable utilization principle has been recognized
by the United States both in its international relations and in its adjudicative
water rights dispute settlement.'" However, the principle has yet to be
effectively utilized in interstate water disputes such as the current one
involving Georgia, Alabama, and Florida. Its acceptance as the sole doctrine
through which to view interstate water rights negotiations would improve the
efficiency and fluidity of the negotiation process.
IV. LESSONS FROM AND APPLICATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

The preceding sections have reviewed several historically significant
international water rights agreements. These negotiations have been between
neighboring countries, sometimes with strained relations, that have been able
to arrive at usage and allotment plans for water rights. How have these
international disputes found resolution? What have been their doctrinal
approaches to water distribution? How do those differ from the methodologies
and systems used domestically? Can the international law approaches they
adopted be applied to domestic interstate disputes? Or are some of the factors
contributing to their success beyond the control of the negotiating parties?
What lessons can be learned from the resolution of these disputes, and how can
they be applied to the negotiations within the tri-state water dispute?
Considering the failure of the ACF Commission to agree on terms of water
distribution acceptable to all parties, clearly new approaches would be helpful.
In particular, in order for dispute resolution to be improved, the inflexibility
of the domestic doctrinal approaches should be relaxed. The riparian system
of water rights, in particular, is deficient in dealing with any situation of
scarcity.' 65 This deficiency is due to riparianism's base assumption: that
"water is available to all riparian and littoral property owners.''" Though
availability is somewhat limited by the necessity of reasonable use, "reasonable use" is a very ambiguous term. Furthermore, these limitations in no way

'" See Boundary Waters Treaty, supranote 153 (where the U.S. applied equitable utilization
in its international relations); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907) (applying equitable
apportionment to adjudication of an interstate water rights dispute).
165 Moore, supra note 1,
at 6.
16 Id.
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restrict the total amount of water that is used. The system is not prepared to
decide between "reasonable" uses when there is not enough water available to
accommodate all users. The basic assumption that all riparian landowners can
make use of the water simply cannot be maintained. 67
Some of these flaws in the riparian system have been addressed in the states
involved in the current dispute. Georgia has attempted to address the problem
by its adoption of a quasi-appropriation permit system." s Florida has adopted
its hybrid system with similar motivations. 69 But the prior appropriations
system, while it is better capable of dealing with situations of scarcity than the
riparianism doctrine, is still a less than ideal doctrine for tackling issues of
interstate water distribution. 7 0 Is the first use of the water to be given
paramount consideration such that the water uses with the most "priority," or
seniority, remain unaffected in instances of scarcity? The prior appropriation
system allows the most senior water uses to be maintained even while uses
more beneficial to the public are neglected.'
Is this doctrine justifiable 72
in
modem times? Historically, it served well to encourage western settlers.
They were more likely to move westward knowing that if they made a use of
the water, they would have the right to maintain said use. In modem day,
however, there is no need that water still be allocated under the motto "first in
time, first in right. 1' 73 This Note argues that the doctrine is antiquated, and
that it would be more equitable to allocate resources such as water by
determining what uses will be the most beneficial.
The reality is that "neither prior appropriation, riparianism, nor a hybrid of
the two, can adequately manage interstate water resources."''1 Though these
approaches have proven effective to varying degrees in dealing with water
distribution within states, they are not capable of serving as the guiding
principles behind interstate negotiations. The problem is that in the internal
evaluations of any state under these doctrines, "withdrawals in a neighboring
state are undervalued.' 75 Interstate water rights negotiations must be
undertaken with a more equitable approach. The negotiations of the ACF

'67See id.
168

id.

" See generally Stephenson, supra note 10, at 92.

'70See Moore, supra note 1, at 6.
171id.

172See GOLDFARB, supra note 50, at 15.
173Moore,
174id.

175Id.

supra note 1, at 6.
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Commission have been undermined by the doctrinal approaches of the states
represented. The participating states must look past their own internal water
allocation systems to find an approach that is more conducive to fluid
negotiations between the states.
A. The Equitable Utilization Principle
The principle of equitable utilization has been best stated by the United
Nations in its Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of
International Watercourses. 176 The Convention states that waters should be
"used and developed ... taking into account the interests of the watercourse
States concerned, consistent with adequate protection of the watercourse.
The Convention goes on to list a number of factors to be used to determine
whether a water source is being equitably utilized. 8 While "existing uses" are
Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, May
21, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 700.
117 Id. art. 5, at 705.
178 Id. art. 6, at 706.
Factors relevant to equitable and reasonable utilization
1. Utilization of an international watercourse in an equitable and reasonable
manner within the meaning of article 5 requires taking into account all
relevant factors and circumstances, including:
(a) Geographic, hydrographic, hydrological, climatic, ecological and
other factors of a natural character;
(b) The social and economic needs of the watercourse States concerned;
(c)
The population dependent on the watercourse in each watercourse
State;
(d)The effects of the use or uses of the watercourses in one watercourse
State on other watercourse States;
(e) Existing and potential uses of the watercourse;
(f)
Conservation, protection, development and economy of use of the
water resources of the watercourse and the costs of measures taken to
that effect;
(g) The availability of alternatives, of comparable value, to a particular
planned or existing use.
2. In the application of article 5 or paragraph I of this article, watercourse
States concerned shall, when the need arises, enter into consultations in a
spirit of cooperation.
3. The weight to be given to each factor is to be determined by its importance
in comparison with that of other relevant factors. In determining what is a
reasonable and equitable use, all relevant factors are to be considered together
and a conclusion reached on the basis of the whole.
76
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one of the factors mentioned, they are not considered of paramount importance
as they are under current domestic water distribution doctrines.
The doctrine of equitable utilization could be criticized for its vagueness.
Under this doctrine, there are indeed a number of factors to be considered in
determining whether a water use can be maintained, but the equitable
utilization principle does not allow for concrete, permanent rights to water use.
At first glance, this could be seen as detraction because there is an appeal to
having permanence. However, when it comes to water rights negotiations, the
feeling of ownership proves to be a burden on successful negotiation. Parties
to a discussion who believe that they possess inalienable rights are liable to be
uncompromising. Concrete rights to water usage create a feeling of entitlement that can be stifling to negotiation."7 9 The equitable utilization principle
furthers the negotiation process, because it avoids this sense of entitlement.
The equitable utilization principle provides for a more flexible negotiation
process.' s Some would argue that this doctrinal approach invites ambiguity
and uncertainty, but oftentimes this sort of ambiguity serves to "assist parties
seeking to defer or avoid stumbling blocks."'' A concrete sense of absolute
right will often lead to sticking points in negotiations (areas in which parties
will not be willing to negotiate and compromise). This sense of absolute right
can prove a barrier to negotiation.
Vagueness, however, provides a motivation to negotiate. As Eyal
Benvenisti has written, through the vague standards such as the equitable
utilization doctrine
the law can prevail on the parties to negotiate. It can do so by
stating a vague standard for water apportionment, rather than
setting a clear rule.... A vague standard would leave room for
negotiations, during which each side could develop its own
interpretation of the standard.... Negotiations under the flexible
standards would not only include lawyers and politicians
concerned about the internal political ramifications of "concessions" to neighboring states; they would also include scientists
from various disciplines who could suggest alternative ways of

'7 See Eyal Benvenisti, Collective Action in the Utilization of Shared Freshwater: The
Challenges ofInternational Water Resources Law, 90 AM. I. INT'LL. 384,404 (1996) (stating
that a lack of "property rights" on existing uses emphasizes the need for negotiation).
'goSee id at 403.
"' Id. at 402.
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reaching optimal solutions, and whose contributions could defuse
the potentially adversarial dimension of the negotiations."8 2
Thus, the equitable utilization doctrine encourages the parties to negotiate
and to come to an agreement that is reasonable for all parties. The allocations
and allotments arising out of these equitable principles will be more just and
impartial than allotments arriving out of the traditional domestic approaches.
Furthermore, the doctrinal incorporation of equitable utilization principles also
allows for an agreement with terms that will be adaptable. This adaptable
approach allows the fulfillment of other areas of policy goals. The protection
of the environment is bound to suffer when states have invariable rights to a
certain allocation of water. When the allocations are more flexible, they can
more readily be modified to allow for the protection
of ecosystems, as well as
83
any other policy concerns that might arise.
The successes of the equitable utilization approach are demonstrated in the
historic water rights disputes previously examined. This approach allowed the
flexibility necessary to accommodate concerns of scarcity and potential
growth. If the ACF Commission were to commit itself to this doctrinal
approach, it could abandon the rigidities of the domestic U.S. water rights
doctrines, which promote a sense ofentitlement and ownership. The equitable
utilization principle would allow negotiations to proceed much more
efficiently and probably more speedily.
B. Composition of the Commission

In addition to the doctrinal approaches that can be implemented from
international law, there are other ways in which the negotiation process could
be improved in terms of efficiency and effectiveness. In particular, there are
constructive ways to improve the composition of the negotiating body.
The ACF Commission is considered to be well-structured.'
The ACF
Compact allows for experts to be involved in the negotiations and the
enforcement of whatever agreement is produced. 8 5 The inclusion of a delegate
from the federal government was also a constructive step. Such a delegate

182Id.
83
"u
"8

See id. at 404.
See Beaverstock, supra note 20, at 1007.
Stephenson, supra note 10, at 101.
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hopefully could serve by facilitating negotiations, as well as indicating the
desires of the national administration.
However, the ACF Commission has clearly not been effective in its task.
First established in 1992, the Commission has yet to reach any sort of
resolution. How could the Commission have been better structured? From
these historic international water rights negotiations, we can draw conclusions
as to a more efficient structure for a negotiating process.
The historic Indus Waters Treaty serves as a good example. There, the
World Bank stepped in and served as mediator of the negotiations."8 6 Both of
the parties were willing to accept the World Bank's impartiality. After
negotiations had taken place, both countries went on to accept the agreement
that arose out of the World Bank's deliberation. 8 7 The lesson to be learned
from this episode is that a strong, impartial mediator can greatly improve the
effectiveness of the negotiation process. Negotiations held without an
effective mediator can take on an unproductive and confrontational demeanor.
The tri-state water negotiations would probably be more successful if the
ACF Commission empowered a strong autonomous mediator, such as a high
figure in the Environmental Protection Agency. Perhaps even more ideal
would be a strong-minded individual or organization from outside of the
political process (a domestic equivalent to the role of the World Bank within
the U.S.). Such a mediator could facilitate and expedite negotiations without
having his or her own agenda to fulfill.
Another lesson to be learned from these historic international water rights
negotiations is the merits of having non-political representatives for the
involved parties. One of the main reasons for the success of the International
Joint Commission, the organization arising out of the 1909 Boundary Waters
Treaty, is that its delegates were nonpolitical.' The ACF Compact attempted
to mimic these successes by having its Commission include experts. 9 But
clearly the states' delegates were not truly non-political, as evidenced by the
effect the 1998 gubernatorial election had on the negotiations."
Of course, the involved state governments must have a say in the direction
of the proceedings, but it would be advantageous to give the representatives
stated goals, and then allow them to operate autonomously. They will be able

186 Graffy,

supra note 91, at 427.

187 id.

Id. at 424.
I'
"'

See Stephenson, supra note 10, at 101.

190Id. at 102-03.
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to negotiate more effectively if they are not required to check every detail with
their governments. For that purpose, a new ACF Compact should include
language directing the states to allow their delegates some autonomy once
chosen.
C. The Threat of Force
The last important trend of note is the effect that the relative military and
economic strengths of the parties have on the negotiating process. This trend
can be seen most prominently in the negotiations of the Ganges River Treaty
and the Mahakali River Treaty. In both instances, India's strength seemed to
show in the resulting bargaining. In the 1996 Ganges Treaty, India again
increased its share of the waters from the Farakka Barrage.19 Its superior size
and military might, coupled with its upstream proximity to Bangladesh,
allowed India the superior bargaining position in water allocation negotiations.
That advantage can be seen in India's increasingly large share of the allocations.
The effect of size and power may also be demonstrated in the Mahakali
River Treaty. In the initial Sarada Treaty of 1920, Nepal's sovereignty was
impugned upon as it surrendered territory to India. 9 2 Nepal, however,
succeeded in at least gaining territory in that agreement. But in the subsequent
Tanakpur Agreement of 1991, Nepal again surrendered its territory, this time
gaining only water and an electricity allotment in return. 93 This agreement,
highly criticized within Nepal, can fairly be seen as a concession in the face of
the compulsions of the more powerful.
The threat of force likewise affects the negotiating process in the absence
of a clear sense of superiority. In the instance of the Indus Water Treaty, India
is a much larger country than Pakistan.' However, in light of their history of
conflict, Pakistan could hardly be alleged to view India with any reverence or
feeling of intimidation.
It can be argued that the threat of force still assisted in the resolution of the
water distribution debates. In fact, the constant imminence of conflict between

'9
'9
9

Salman & Uprety, supra note 105, at 325.
Id. at 301.

Id. at 302.

I" India has a population of over one billion, with a territory of 1,148,000 square miles;
Pakistan has apopulation of less than 150,000,000 with aterritory of 300,700 square miles. THE
WoRLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 793, 825 (William A. McGovern, Jr. et al. eds., 2003
ed.).
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the negotiating countries could well have contributed to their water allotment
debate being resolved so expeditiously and equitably. In instances where the
parties recognize that there is a threat of outright conflict, those parties have
more incentive to negotiate amicably and flexibly.
This effect would unfortunately be difficult to incorporate into the ACF
Compact or any other interstate negotiation. The threat of use of force cannot
be falsified to compel expeditious negotiation. However, such negotiation
might otherwise be compelled. The federal government could threaten to
resolve the allotment debate on its own terms if the states are not able to do so.
The government could also threaten a loss of appropriations and spending to
compel swift negotiations. This threat of economic force could increase the
states' willingness to compromise, and thus the parties to the ACF Compact
would be wise to attempt to incorporate these effects into their terms of
agreement.
V. CONCLUSION

The negotiations that have taken place under the ACF Compact have thus
far proven unproductive. The negotiating process would be furthered if
negotiators were to give consideration to aspects of the international water
rights mechanisms. First, full implementation of the equitable utilization
principle would greatly benefit the negotiations. Equitable utilization allows
flexibility that is conspicuously absent from the domestic doctrinal approaches
to water allocation. Second, the efficiency of the negotiating process would
be improved if the composition of the ACF Commission were modified.
Having a strong, autonomous mediator would allow negotiation to proceed
more smoothly. In addition, the negotiations could be conducted more
efficiently if the delegates were likewise allowed increased autonomy. Last,
some method of compulsion is desirable to increase the motivations of the
parties. A manner of ultimatum from the federal government could provide the
negotiators with an incentive to expedite negotiations.
Interstate water rights negotiations are inherently problematic, but they
have in the above mentioned instances been resolved in a manner more
efficient than that used in the tri-state water negotiations. Application of these
concepts from international law would allow increased efficiency in the
negotiation process. Incorporating these concepts into the tri-state negotiations
would surely prove advantageous.

